Although the opposition seemed strong in Iran, Mousavi lost the election to Ahmadinejad, and protests around election fraud are already running rampant in the Islamic republic:

Iran's government announced an overwhelming re-election victory Saturday for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad , but his chief opponent called the results a fraud and confrontations broke out between students and security forces.

A McClatchy reporter saw groups of armored, baton-wielding special forces units charge and disperse groups of students along central Vali Asr Street in Tehran , occasionally striking civilians with their batons. A few students threw rocks, some from the windows of buildings above.

"Democracy is dead in Iran , by these elections. ... It is some kind of catastrophe, by this large fraud," said journalist Tahere Eibodi, as she stood outside the campaign headquarters of Ahmadinjeda's principal opponent, former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi , a relative moderate who attracted intense support from many young people.

Of course, we're unlikely ever to find out whether Ahmadinejad actually pulled a fast one on Mousavi. Politics rhymes ill with honesty, especially in an ultra-conservative, authoritarian regime like Iran, where practical outcome means more than abiding the law. So what now? Well, for starters, these protests are simply the beginning of a larger public distrust that is likely to grow stronger over time against the newly elected President. Ahmadinejad will in other words have problems trying to maintain his popularity. The Brussels Journal notes:

If Ahmadinejad can cling to power, his position will be weakened. This, in itself, will compel him to show strength -especially in areas were it is lacking. Additionally, his campaign made the country‘s nuclear rise into the center piece of his policy. If he wins, it will be the work on the bomb that had distinguished him from his otherwise more persuasive opposition. This, too, will make concessions difficult and confrontation into a consequence of internal political considerations.

The scenario very much resembles that of North Korea. Kim Jong is flexing missile muscle in the face of the international community to boost his mojo, just like a kid from the block buys himself a BMW and speeds through the city all day to prove he's hot. It's a statement: look what I can do, and no one dares to stop me. If poverty and other nationwide problems are not going away, you have to divert the attention over to other things, like standing up against the world's super power and getting away with it.

Ahmadinejad, who in the coming months will need to boost his own damaged mojo, may consider doing something similar. This leaves room for speculation around what the Israeli-American response would be in case such an attack actually became reality:

Israel's alternative is that Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs reach fruition, leaving its very existence at the whim of its staunchest adversary. Israel has not previously accepted such risks. It destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and a Syrian reactor being built by North Koreans in 2007. One major new element in Israel's calculus is the Obama administration's growing distance (especially in contrast to its predecessor).

Risks to its civilian population will weigh heavily in any Israeli decision to use force, and might well argue for simultaneous, pre-emptive attacks on Hezbollah and Hamas in conjunction with a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Obviously, Israel will have to measure the current risks to its safety and survival against the longer-term threat to its very existence once Iran acquires nuclear weapons.

Many argue that Israeli military action will cause Iranians to rally in support of the mullahs' regime and plunge the region into political chaos. To the contrary, a strike accompanied by effective public diplomacy could well turn Iran's diverse population against an oppressive regime. Most of the Arab world's leaders would welcome Israel solving the Iran nuclear problem, although they certainly won't say so publicly and will rhetorically embrace Iran if Israel strikes. But rhetoric from its Arab neighbors is the only quantum of solace Iran will get.

Make sure you read the six different scenarios outlined in that article. They highlight the complex dynamics in the relationship between Iran and Western powers. Before you dismiss the idea of Israel ever committing itself to such aggression, consider the recent growth of radicalism, nationalism and pragmatism seen in Israel this year. When the Israeli military decides to strike back against Hamas in Gaza, and doesn't really care whether or not it breaks international laws, that is a reflection of the current mentality in office. Add an unstable Iranian regime to the equation, with a President desperate to increase his public support by doing some muscle flexing on his own, this conflict between mini-empires will not go away anytime soon.

America will back Israel in case of war (no, not even Obama will cop out on that one), but where does Russia stand, a key player in helping the US to dismantle Iran's nuclear program?

Moscow's stance on sanctions matters because no matter who wins Friday's election, both the frontrunners made clear that they had no intention of giving in to Western demands that Iran halt uranium enrichment. The real decisions about Iran's nuclear future will be made by the clerical Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who continues to defy the U.S., Europe and the International Atomic Energy Agency. So, Washington believes that coordinated international pressure is the only chance the West has to talk Iran back from the nuclear brink. And Russia, which is helping Iran build its nuclear reactor at Bushehr and which is one of Tehran's key arms suppliers - as well as holding veto power at the U.N. Security Council - may hold the key to making tougher sanctions work.

Russia is certainly well placed to put the squeeze on Tehran because of its extensive business ties with Iran, including in the energy sector. For all its oil reserves, Iran's energy infrastructure is old and failing, and it is forced to import a large proportion of its gasoline needs. Washington believes the regime will be responsive to moves by the outside world to blocks improvements and investment in its energy sector. Russian support is also key to achieving an international consensus for raising the pressure on Iran - if it signs on for new sanctions, the chances are much higher of achieving broad agreement at the U.N. in September.

The Russians appreciate all this. "We clearly value this very intense and in-depth dialogue on non-proliferation," says Ryabkov. But will it buy any help on Iran? When it comes to the missile-defense program, he answers, "We do not think that this linkage is fair," because Russia believes the anti-missile system Washington had planned to station in Poland and the Czech Republic would not help defend against a potential Iranian threat. Russia loves the revival of arms-control talks with the new Administration, but it sees Iran's nuclear program as a separate issue - on which it's holding its cards close.

The Russians play their cards strategically, because they're walking a fine line between becoming a puppy to American-Israeli interests and keeping their few geopolitical allies to boost their own power on the world chart. That means they will advance slowly, knowing they hold a key position in important matters down in the Middle East. As he’s already shown, Medvedev is likely to continue embracing Obama's softer approach in foreign policy, but sit tight. For Ahmadinejad, though, the case is different: he's currently blamed for election fraud, his nation is in turmoil, and his enemy is further radicalizing itself for each day that goes by. As I always say: things are likely to blow up.